When partners walk: lessons for UK law firms from the fall of Weil, Gotshal & Manges
On 10 November 2026, the partners of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP (Weil) voted to dissolve the firm, reportedly by a majority of around 97%, and appointed a three-member committee to oversee the wind-down. The vote followed a recommendation by Weil’s management committee on 28 October 2026 of winding the practice down.
The speed of events was remarkable. In September, the chair of Weil’s corporate department announced his move to Cravath, Swaine & Moore with a group of partners. Further departures followed in New York and London, with more than 30 partners reported to have left during 2026. The partner chosen to succeed the firm’s long-standing executive partner in January 2027 decided not to take the role. Merger talks with Willkie Farr & Gallagher ended around 22 October. Six days later, the wind-down was recommended.
This was not a small or struggling firm. Weil had around 1,200 lawyers and reported revenue of approximately US$2 billion in 2025. Its London office had around 45 partners and some 200 lawyers. The firm reportedly carried no debt.
Why it matters?
Previous large law firm failures, Dewey & LeBoeuf in 2012 being the obvious example, are usually explained by debt, over-expansion or misconduct. Weil appears different. Its collapse looks less like insolvency and more like a run on a bank, in which the “deposits” are partners and the client relationships they carry.
Professor John Morley of Yale Law School (Morley), who has studied law firm describes this dynamic. In a partner-owned firm, each departure increases the risk borne by those who remain, which encourages further departures. The partners best able to leave, those with the strongest client followings, tend to leave first. Morley has observed that Weil followed this pattern closely.
The UK has seen the same dynamic. The European arm of King & Wood Mallesons (KWM) entered administration in January 2017 after a year of partner departures, a leadership vacuum and failed merger and recapitalisation efforts; its administrators said partner exits had accelerated its demise.
What UK law firms should do better?
Treat partner retention as a core financial risk
Partners are a law firm’s principal asset, and they can leave at short notice. Law firm boards should monitor partner sentiment and lateral departures with the same discipline they apply to lock-up and cash. A cluster of departures from one practice, or the loss of a member of the management team, should prompt a structured response rather than reassurance.
Reduce dependence on a small number of individuals
Where a handful of partners control a large share of revenue or key client relationships, the firm’s stability rests on their personal decisions. Firms should institutionalise those relationships through team-based client coverage, multi-partner relationship structures, and planned handover of relationships well before senior partners retire or move.
Plan leadership succession early and openly
At Weil, uncertainty over leadership succession coincided with the loss of confidence. At KWM, the firm went for months without a settled managing partner. Succession should be a standing board item, with credible internal candidates developed years in advance and a fallback in place if the chosen candidate withdraws.
Stress-test the LLP agreement for a crisis, not just for normal times
Many LLP members’ agreements are drafted with orderly retirements and occasional departures in mind. Firms should review them on the assumption that a significant proportion of the partnership leaves within a few months. Key questions include:
Notice and garden leave: are the periods enforceable and realistic? Long notice periods may slow departures but are often negotiated away under pressure.
Restrictive covenants: are they drafted narrowly enough to be enforceable under English restraint of trade principles?
Legacy obligations: are retired members’ annuities and similar commitments funded and properly ranked?
Team moves: does the agreement deal clearly with members who solicit colleagues or teams to leave with them?
Gaps: where the agreement is silent, the default rules in the Limited Liability Partnerships Regulations 2001 may apply, which may not be suitable in a crisis. Therefore, firms need to be mindful of any such gaps.
Understand the insolvency overlay and how it shapes behaviour
Under section 214A of the Insolvency Act 1986, as applied to LLPs, a liquidator may seek to recover withdrawals made by a member in the two years before winding up where the member knew, or had reasonable grounds to believe, that the LLP was unable to pay its debts or would become so as a result. Members may also have given personal guarantees for property or banking facilities. Partners who sense trouble therefore have a rational incentive to leave early.
Firms should keep personal exposure to a minimum, keep long-term commitments such as leases proportionate to the firm’s resilience, and maintain prudent cash reserves.
Strengthen governance and transparency
Partners who feel uninformed are quicker to leave. UK firms should ensure that their boards provide genuine challenge (including, where appropriate, through independent non-executive members), that members receive timely and accurate financial information, and that the Compliance Officer for Legal Practice as well as the Compliance Officer for Finance and Administration are properly resourced and supported. Candid communication in a difficult period is more likely to preserve confidence than silence.
Prepare an orderly closure plan before it is needed
No firm wants to plan for its own closure, but doing so protects clients, staff and partners. Key considerations in England and Wales include:
Regulatory: closure must be managed in line with SRA requirements and guidance, including on client money, client files and confidentiality.
Insurance: where there is no successor practice, the firm’s insurer must provide six years’ run-off cover. The premium is commonly two to three times the last annual premium and falls on the principals.
People: collective consultation obligations apply where 20 or more employees are to be made redundant at one establishment within 90 days.
A documented contingency plan allows a firm to act quickly and preserve value, including through the sale of practices or teams, rather than improvising under pressure.
Consider capital structure deliberately
In the US, the Weil collapse has renewed debate about whether reliance on partner capital leaves law firms too fragile. England and Wales have permitted external ownership through alternative business structures since the Legal Services Act 2007, and several UK firms have listed or taken private equity investment. Outside capital is not a cure for a loss of partner confidence, and it brings its own governance demands. Firms should nonetheless consider whether their current structure gives them the resilience and investment capacity they need.
Concluding Thoughts
The central lesson of Weil is that profitability and reputation are not, on their own, protection. A law firm is held together by its partners’ confidence in its future; once that confidence goes, a firm can unravel within weeks. UK firms of every size should use this moment to test their own vulnerabilities honestly, while there is still time to address them.
How O’Connors can help
O’Connors advises law firms, barristers’ chambers and other legal services businesses on corporate, commercial, insurance and regulatory matters, including LLP members’ agreements, governance, mergers and acquisitions, and SRA compliance. To discuss how these issues affect your firm, please contact Raj Chavda.
This article reflects publicly reported information as at 11 November 2026. It is for general information only and does not constitute legal advice. Specific advice should be taken on any particular matter.